CCPO appeals to militants: COVID cases rising, postpone rallies
CEBU CITY, Philippines — With at least 200 policemen on standby to secure any rallies in Cebu City, police are appealing to militant groups to postpone the holding of street rallies tomorrow, July 26, when President Rodrigo Duterte will deliver his last State of the Nation Address (SONA). Police Lieutenant Colonel Wilbert Parilla, deputy director […] The post CCPO appeals to militants: COVID cases rising, postpone rallies appeared first on Cebu Daily News......»»
Masking, lockdown not needed for rising pertussis cases – DOH
Despite the alarming increase in pertussis cases in the country, an official of the Department of Health said there is no need for a lockdown or mandatory wearing of face masks......»»
Kids advised to wear masks
People, especially children, have been advised to wear face masks as a form of protection after the Department of Health (DOH) sounded the alarm over the rising cases of pertussis or whooping cough in the country......»»
Teen centers in Cebu City pushed amid rising teen pregnancy cases
CEBU CITY, Philippines — In response to the alarming rise in teenage pregnancy cases across Cebu, a local legislator penned a resolution urging the establishment of local adolescents and teen centers in Cebu. City Councilor Rey Gealon stipulated in the resolution the importance of providing essential support and education to empower young individuals in making.....»»
Court of Appeals revives 2 cases against Kerwin Espinosa
Espinosa walked free from detention last year after posting bail in his remaining criminal cases, sources tell Rappler.....»»
CA reverses dismissal of De Lima cases vs Aguirre, Guevarra
The Court of Appeals has reversed for lack of due process the Office of the Ombudsman’s dismissal of former senator Leila de Lima’s complaints against former justice secretaries Vitaliano Aguirre and Menardo Guevarra over the use of convicted criminals as state witnesses in her drug cases......»»
CA reverses Ombudsman’s decision junking de Lima’s cases vs Aguirre, Guevarra
MANILA, Philippines — The Court of Appeals (CA) has reversed the ruling of the Office of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal and administrative complaints lodged by former Senator Leila de Lima against former Department of Justice secretaries Vitaliano Aguirre II and Menardo Guevarra. In its decision dated November 21, CA Special 17th Division granted De.....»»
Retroactive application of Family Code
Married before the effectivity of the Family Code, and fear you cannot nullify your marriage based on the grounds provided therein? Fret not, the Supreme Court has reiterated in a recent case that the Family Code, which took effect on 03 August 1988, shall be given retroactive effect unless vested or acquired rights under relevant laws will be prejudiced or impaired. According to Arthur Candelario v. Marlene Candelario and Office of the Solicitor General (G.R. No. 222068, 25 July 2023), psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code can be applied to the marriage contracted on 11 June 1984 by the parties in this case. Article 256 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the law, including its provision on psychological incapacity, shall have retroactive effect. As such, the ruling of the lower court that the marriage cannot be nullified under Article 36 of the Family Code as the law only became effective after the parties’ marriage was set aside. The Supreme Court also stressed that Republic Act No. 8533 has amended Article 39 of the Family Code, which previously distinguished between marriages solemnized before and after its effectivity. Art. 39 now provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the nullity of marriage shall not prescribe, without distinction, whether the marriage was solemnized before or after the effectivity of the Family Code. A plain reading of the law even shows that nowhere in Art. 36 is it stated that the same may not be applied to marriages celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. It is basic in statutory construction that where the law is not ambiguous, the Court may not introduce exceptions or conditions where none is provided. Likewise, deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee show that the same issue was considered, and the retroactive application of Art. 36 was voted upon. Jurisprudence is replete with the same pronouncements, such as Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals (1997), Republic v. Molina (1997), Republic v. Enclean (2013), and Republic v. De Gracia (2014). The Court cited the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General in this case — that any ruling to the contrary discriminates against married couples for no reason other than having the misfortune of getting married before the enactment of the Family Code. All persons can be afflicted with a psychological disorder resulting in incapacity to perform marital obligations. As such, the issue must not focus on when the parties invoking the nullification contracted the marriage, but on whether the requirements of psychological incapacity under the law are present. In this case, while the Court agreed that Art. 36 may be applied, it negated the finding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential obligations in marriage. Following the same, what is indeed essential in these cases is proving the existence of psychological incapacity, in which gravity, incurability, and juridical antecedence must be established. For more of Dean Nilo Divina’s legal tidbits, please visit www.divinalaw.com. For comments and questions, please send an email to cabdo@divinalaw.com. The post Retroactive application of Family Code appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
The only brief that is long
Jurisprudence holds that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. (Fenequito v. Vergara Jr., G.R. No. 172829, 18 July 2012). An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appellant or appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites in the Rules of Court. With respect to ordinary appealed cases to the Court of Appeals (CA), Section 7, Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure requires an appellant to file an Appellant’s Brief with the CA within 45 days from receipt of the notice of the clerk. According to the Supreme Court in Philippine Coconut Authority v. Corona International Inc. (G.R. No. 13991, 29 September 2000), the purpose of the Appellant’s Brief is to present to the court in coherent and concise form the point and questions in controversy and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case, to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. Failure to file an Appellant’s Brief within the prescribed period is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. (Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Revised Rules) However, the SC clarified in Sindophil Inc. v. Republic (G.R. No. 204594, 07 November 2018) that the use of the permissive “may” in the wording of the above-stated provision means the dismissal of an appeal by the CA is directory and not mandatory. This means that the failure to file an appellant’s brief within the reglementary period would not automatically result in the outright dismissal of the appeal, as the CA is bound to exercise its sound discretion whether to allow the appeal to proceed or not. The SC explained that allowing the appeal despite the failure to file an Appellant’s Brief must be decided by the CA, taking into account all the factors surrounding the case. Its discretion must be exercised with due regard to justice and fair play under the circumstances. In several cases, the question of whether or not to sustain the dismissal of an appeal due to the appellant’s failure to file the Appellant’s Brief had been raised before the SC. In some of these cases, the High Court relaxed the Rules and allowed the belated filing of the Appellant’s Brief. In other cases, however, the Court applied the Rules strictly and considered the appeal abandoned, which thus resulted in its eventual dismissal. Finally, in Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 164150, 14 April 2008), the SC revisited the cases that it had previously decided and laid down the following guidelines in confronting the issue of non-filing of the Appellant’s Brief: 1. The general rule is for the CA to dismiss an appeal when no appellant’s brief is filed within the reglementary period prescribed by the rules; 2. The power conferred upon the CA to dismiss an appeal is discretionary and directory and not ministerial or mandatory; 3. The failure of an appellant to file his brief within the reglementary period does not have the effect of causing the automatic dismissal of the appeal; 4. In case of late filing, the appellate court has the power to still allow the appeal; however, for the proper exercise of the court’s leniency[,] it is imperative that: (a) the circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality; (b) that strong considerations of equity justify an exception to the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice; (c) no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by the delay; (d) there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced; or (e) at least there is no motion to dismiss filed. 5. In case of delay, the lapse must be for a reasonable period; and 6.Inadvertence of counsel cannot be considered as an adequate excuse to call for the appellate court’s indulgence except: (a) where the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (b) when application of the rule will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property or (c) where the interests of justice so require. The post The only brief that is long appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
CA junks telco’s frequency plea, mandamus case vs. NTC
The Court of Appeals junked the petition for mandamus filed by NOW Telecom Company Inc. against the National Telecommunications Commission or NTC over the company's provisional authority or PA application to operate a cellular mobile telephone service within specific frequency ranges. In a 16-page decision, the appellate court's Special Ninth Division said "the court is powerless" to grant NOW Telecom's plea, especially since the company failed to show a clear legal right to the frequencies it sought. The CA said the decision, penned by Associate Justice Tita Marilyn B. Payoyo-Villordon and concurred in by Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez and Walter S. Ong, followed a careful examination of the case. The case began from NOW Telecom's request for NTC's automatic approval issued by the Anti-Red Tape Authority or ARTA. NOW Telecom had filed a petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to compel the NTC and former Commissioner Gamaliel Asis Cordoba to stick to ARTA's resolution and OAA both dated 1 March 2021. These ARTA documents stated that NOW Telecom's application for a PA to operate in the frequency range 1970 Mhz-1980 Mhz paired with 2160 Mhz to 2170 Mhz and 3.6 GHz to 3.8 GHz frequency ranges was automatically approved by operation of law. It followed Republic Act 11032, otherwise known as the Ease of Doing Business and Efficient Government Service Delivery Act of 2018. However, an ARTA resolution dated 17 June 2022 reversed the previous decisions and formally recommended NOW Telecom's application for frequency assignment to the NTC. NOW Telecom's mandamus petition was notably based on its claim for the rights to specific frequency ranges, alleging that the NTC had unjustly neglected its duty to assign them. Yet, court records showed that as early as December 2005, NTC already found NOW Telecom to be non-compliant and was disqualified from the assignment of 3G frequency bands due to unpaid supervision and regulation fees or SRF and spectrum user fees or SUF amounting to P2.6 billion. NOW Telecom has a pending petition filed before the Supreme Court for this penalty imposed by the NTC. NOW Telecom received its PA in January 2006, but it was not specific to 3G and under the condition of paying its outstanding SRF and SUF obligations. In December 2017, NOW Telecom was designated the 20MHz contiguous bandwidth, 3520 to 3540 MHz, under the 3.5 GHz on the same condition that it resolved its outstanding SUF and SRF fines. NOW Telecom's Provisional Authority was extended until September 2020, but the NTC reiterated that the company failed to fulfill the conditions regarding SUF and SRF. Despite the issues hounding the company, NOW Corp. CEO Mel Velarde said he hopes the "Marcos administration" will aid the immediate settlement of its cases as a way of maintaining a "level playing field." _ The post CA junks telco’s frequency plea, mandamus case vs. NTC appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
US federal judge, 96, suspended over ‘mental fitness’
The oldest US federal judge, at age 96, was suspended from her duties Wednesday over questions about her mental competency, in a case evoking the debate over elderly politicians like Joe Biden and Donald Trump. Pauline Newman, an appellate court judge since 1984, was accused by colleagues of working too slowly and of frequently appearing confused, agitated, and belligerent, which raised concerns of "disability," according to the ruling by the Judicial Council of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Interviews with staff "provided overwhelming evidence that Judge Newman may be experiencing significant mental problems including memory loss, lack of comprehension, confusion, and an inability to perform basic tasks," it said. Despite being given a reduced workload, Newman takes four times as long as other judges to issue opinions in cases before the court, it said. The council said that because Newman refused to accept being examined by a council-chosen neurologist and psychiatrist to judge her mental acuity, it was suspending her for one year, which could be extended if she still refused to cooperate. But Newman, who has been deprived of reviewing cases since April, has said the proceedings against her were conducted illegally and suggested they were the product of personal animosity from other judges. She backed her argument with the results of examinations by specialists she herself chose. "Judge Newman demonstrated no substantial emotional, medical, or psychiatric disability that would interfere with continuation of her longstanding duties as a judge," psychiatrist Regina Carney said. The case comes amid questions about the capabilities of an increasing number of elderly politicians -- President Joe Biden, 80, and rival Donald Trump, 77, among them -- to perform their duties. Born in 1927, Newman earned a PhD in chemistry from Yale and then became a patent law expert. In 1984 she was named to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a special court dealing with patent laws and government contracts. The ruling against her noted she had been called "the heroine of the patent system." Her attorney, Gregory Dolin of the New Civil Liberties Alliance, said the review of her case was stacked against her. "The bottom line is that Judge Newman did not get due process," he told AFP. He said personal animosities as well as ageism factored into the case. "It's easy to say she's 96, she's past her prime, even if it's not true," Dolin said. "Whatever you might say about some politicians in Washington, Judge Newman is not in that group," he added. The post US federal judge, 96, suspended over ‘mental fitness’ appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
When prior decree is not necessary (2)
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked to contract a second marriage. A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. In Domingo v Court of Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement: Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v Mendoza, People v Aragon, and Odayat v Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Mendoza (1954), the appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941 and 1949. The second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted after the second wife’s death. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance and, hence, nonexistent without a judicial decree declaring it so. This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents. In Odayat (1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code. Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an ‘inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family”; as such, it “shall be protected by the State.” In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as “a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.” So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage to contract another cannot be accomplished merely based on the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to mockery and rest on very shaky foundations. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone. What, then, is the important reckoning date? 3 August 1988. If the marriage was before then, no judicial declaration is needed. If after, then one is necessary. Now you know. Marriage, a sacrosanct institution declared by the Constitution as an ‘inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family’; as such, the State shall protect it. Sources: Article 349, Revised Penal Code Article 40, Family Code Renato A. Castillo vs Lea De Leon P. Castillo (G.R. No. 189607, 18 April 2016) The post When prior decree is not necessary (2) appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Ressa, Rappler acquitted of tax evasion
Nobel Laureate Maria Ressa and Rappler Holdings Corporation were acquitted by a Pasig court in a tax evasion case filed in connection with their supposed failure to declare tax in 2015. Atty. Francis Lim, counsel of Ressa, said his client and RHC were acquitted by the Pasig Regional Trial Court Branch 157 of violation of Section 255 of the National Internal Revenue Code (Tax Code) for the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. All five tax evasion charges filed against the respondents have been junked by the Pasig RTC which was filed during the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte. Ressa, 59 years old, shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov in 2021. She has been fighting multiple charges filed during the administration of former President Rodrigo Duterte. The journalist and Rappler had faced five government charges of tax evasion stemming from the 2015 sale of Philippine depositary receipts, which is a way for companies to raise money from foreign investors. In January, the Court of Tax Appeals First Division found Ressa and RHC not guilty on three counts of failure to supply the correct information and one count of tax evasion, amounting to P141 million worth of taxes, including surcharge and interest. The fifth charge was heard by a different court, which cleared her and Rappler of wrongdoing yesterday. However, Ressa and Rappler face an uncertain future as they battle another two court cases, despite the acquittals. Ressa and a former colleague Rey Santos Jr. are appealing a cyber libel conviction that carries a nearly seven-year jail sentence. The post Ressa, Rappler acquitted of tax evasion appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Void ownership, void contract
Rebecca Fullido and Gino Grilli, an Italian, were sweethearts. Eventually, they maintained a common-law relationship. In time, Gino bought a lot for them and had a house built on it. Gino, being a foreigner prohibited from purchasing real estate, and the title to the land was put in the name of Rebecca. But to ensure his right over it, they entered into an agreement whereby Gino leased the property from Rebecca for fifty years, subject to an automatic renewal for a like period. In addition, they entered into an agreement where Gino, among others, denied Rebecca the right to dispose of the property and that her hold on to it would be a co-terminus with their relationship. The time came when their relationship went sour. Parties traded accusations of unfaithfulness against each other. Court actions ensued. Rebecca filed for a protection order against Gino under the Violence Against Women and Children Law or VAWC. Gino filed for the ejectment of Rebecca from their land. In the ejectment case, the court sided with Rebecca. It said that she could not be ousted because she was a co-owner. The court also considered the protection order issued by another court against Gino. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court opined that the action filed by Rebecca against Gino had no bearing on the ejectment case. And since the only issue in the ejectment case is who has a better right to possession, the court sided with Gino citing the presence of a valid and existing lease in his favor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the appealed court. Rebecca, undaunted, went to the Supreme Court. She posited that Gino had no right over the property. For one, he is a foreigner prohibited by the Constitution from owning land. And another, the contract the parties entered into had no effect whatsoever as Gino had no right to own land in the first place. To this issue, the Supreme Court ruled, “Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands, and in such cases, the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. xxx xxx The prohibition on the transfer of lands to aliens was adopted in the present 1987 Constitution, under Sections 2, 3, and 7 of Article XII thereof. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, include residential, commercial, and industrial lands. The purpose of prohibiting the transfer of lands to foreigners is to uphold the conservation of our national patrimony and ensure that agricultural resources remain in the hands of Filipino citizens. “The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It also covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all the rights of dominion. In the landmark case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She, the Court struck down a lease contract of a parcel of land in favor of a foreigner for a period of 99 years with an option to buy the land for 50 years. “Where a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of lands to aliens is readily revealed as the purpose for the contracts, then the illicit purpose becomes the illegal cause rendering the contracts void. Thus, if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to dispose of it — rights which constitute ownership. “If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines is indeed in grave peril. Based on the above-cited constitutional, legal, and jurisprudential limitations, the Court finds that the lease contract and the MoA in the present case are null and void for virtually transferring the reigns of the land to a foreigner. xxx xxx “Evidently, the lease contract and the MoA operated hand-in-hand to strip Fullido of any dignified right over her own property. The term of lease for 100 years was obviously in excess of the allowable periods under PD No. 471. xxx xxx The title of Fullido over the land became an empty and useless vessel, visible only on paper, and was only meant as a dummy to fulfill a foreigner’s desire to own land within our soils. It is disturbing how these documents were methodically formulated to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against land ownership by foreigners. “The said contracts attempted to guise themselves as a lease, but a closer scrutiny of the same revealed that they were intended to transfer the dominion of a land to a foreigner in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Even if Fullido voluntarily executed the same, no amount of consent from the parties could legalize an unconstitutional agreement. The lease contract and the MoA do not deserve an iota of validity and must be rightfully struck down as null and void for being repugnant to the fundamental law. These void documents cannot be the source of rights and must be treated as mere scraps of paper.” The facts and the quoted salient portion of the decision are from Rebecca Fullido vs Gino Grilli (G.R. 215014, 29 February 2016) The post Void ownership, void contract appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Guidelines on electronic submission of pleadings in lower courts
The Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated 11 April 2023, approved A.M. Nos. 10-3-7-SC and 11-9-4-CV or the Guidelines on Submission of Electronic Copies of Pleadings and Other Court Submissions Being Filed Before the Lower Courts Pursuant to the Efficient Use of Paper Rule. Under the Guidelines, electronic transmittal shall be the primary method for filing all pleadings and court submissions in all cases governed by the Rules of Court, as amended, before all lower courts (i.e., first and second-level courts, Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Sandiganbayan) starting 5 April 2024. The Guidelines outline the electronic transmittal process for submitting PDF copies of pleadings, annexes, exhibits, and other related documents. These documents should be transmitted to the official e-mail address of the court where the case is pending. All electronic transmittals must be made using the e-mail addresses of record of the filing party or counsel who are required to use a professional email account as their email addresses of record. Counsels are likewise mandated to regularly monitor their respective e-mail inboxes. In case an electronic transmittal is made with an e-mail address not found on record, the entire transmittal shall not be considered as filed. In instances when the primary manner of filing is through personal filing, by registered mail, or by accredited courier in accordance with Rule 13, Section 3(a), 3(b), or 3(c) of the Rules of Court, the PDF copies must be transmitted within 24 hours from the filing of the paper copy. In such case, the pleading shall be deemed filed on the date and time of filing of the paper copy. The filer is likewise required to execute a verified declaration that the pleading or court submission and its accompanying documents, if any, submitted electronically are complete and true copies of the paper copies filed and served. In case of a violation of the said declaration, the court, on motion or motu proprio, and after notice and hearing, may impose sanctions against the lawyer, law firm, or party responsible for the filing. For cases primarily filed through electronic transmittal, subsequent paper copies are not necessary, and the electronic transmittal time shall be considered as the time of filing. It bears noting that the court’s permission is required for certain types of documents before they may be filed through electronic transmittal (e.g. initiatory pleadings and initiatory responsive pleadings, sealed and confidential documents or records, etc.). To establish the proof of filing, the PDF copy of the pleadings filed personally should reflect the written or stamped acknowledgment by the clerk of court. Meanwhile, the PDF copies of pleadings or court submissions filed by registered mail or accredited courier should show the proof of mailing as required under the Rules of Court as well as the proof of payment, as applicable. As regards pleadings that were electronically filed, the PDF should include an affidavit of electronic filing. The Guidelines further specify rules for file attachment, filename formats, transmittal e-mail structure, and other relevant matters. According to the Supreme Court, the Guidelines aim to address docket congestion and court delay, help reduce the use of paper, and facilitate the time and fair delivery of justice. The issuance of the Guidelines is indeed a step closer to the Supreme Court’s goal of digitally transforming the judiciary system. On the part of law practitioners, this is a welcome development as this will save them valuable time and resources in the filing and service of pleadings. For more of Dean Nilo Divina’s legal tidbits, please visit www.divinalaw.com. For comments and questions, please send an email to cabdo@divinalaw.com. The post Guidelines on electronic submission of pleadings in lower courts appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Short-circuited reforms
Judicial intervention in business transactions never had a stronger impact on Filipinos than the effect of the Court of Appeals stopping the Energy Regulatory Commission, or ERC, from compelling San Miguel Corp. power units to honor their contracts with Manila Electric Co. About a month ago, the CA handed down a permanent injunction on the consolidated cases of SMC units South Premiere Power Corp. and San Miguel Energy Corp. to overturn the ERC’s rejection of petitions to suspend their straight-price contracts. Energy Secretary Raphael “Popo” Lotilla said in a recent interview with Daily Tribune’s Straight Talk the Solicitor General will continue to challenge the injunction order up to the Supreme Court. “We don’t want the courts to be second-guessing the decisions of administrative bodies like the Energy Regulatory Commission,” according to Lotilla. The straight pricing regime in the power sector should have complemented the policy of the Department of Energy to move away from subsidies in the cost of electricity. Consumer groups had also filed a motion for reconsideration before the CA against the injunction. In July, the CA overturned the ERC to honor the SMC units’ straight-priced power contracts. The decision, consumer groups fear will open the floodgates to higher electricity costs, as SMC and other fossil fuel power generators will be emboldened to ask for more rate increases as they can apply for and possibly secure price adjustments during their contracts’ lifetime through the courts. The consumer groups consider the CA’s move a big blow to consumers since it negates the straight-pricing contracts. All straight-price contracts, 23 based on ERC records, are now at risk of price adjustments. In his recent State of the Nation Address, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. indicated the goal of achieving competitive pricing for electricity, which will be negated by the CA’s injunction order. Consumer groups said the injunction order allowed SMC to ultimately hijack bidding systems for power supply agreements that are in place to protect consumers. SolGen Menardo Guevarra will submit the challenge based on the position that the injunction order interferes with administrative functions. “We will not see an immediate impact of the decision but it will affect prices because they involve fix-rate contacts between SMC and Meralco,” according to the energy chief. “The Solicitor General’s Office has made clear that the government opposed the issuance of injunction orders and therefore would be ready to appeal, I’m sure,” he indicated. Lotilla said the list of rules that the DoE issued was meant to address the problems in the industry and bring down rates to reasonable levels. “We have made the policy decision not to subsidize electricity, so we cannot think of telling the distributor or telling our people that prices are going to be drastically reduced,” Lotilla said. The initiative of the electricity distributor to bid out fixed price contracts would have offset the DoE plan to remove all forms of subsidies on electricity prices and thus make the monthly bills truly equitable. The market reforms have been thrown off course by the court injunction which has had the effect of usurping the authority of a quasi-judicial body while clearly favoring SMC. The post Short-circuited reforms appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
ABS-CBN review petition vs Willie dismissed
Issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court’s Third Division, in a 22-page decision penned by Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, dismissing the Petitions for Review filed by ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation and partly granting the Petition for Review filed by Willie B. Revillame. The petitions challenge various rulings of the Court of Appeals thus on 23 August 2010, Revillame filed a civil action before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court seeking to cancel, terminate, and rescind his three-year contract with ABS-CBN (Civil Case No. Q-10-67770). Revilla under the contract, was to host the show “Wowowee” on the ABS-CBN network until 10 September 2011 “or upon cancellation or earlier termination of the program.” The suit prompted Revillame to withdraw from “Wowowee” on 5 May 2010, which was followed by ABS-CBN’s refusal to release Revillame as its talent and the network’s subsequent replacement of “Wowowee” with a different program. The television company on 15 September 2010, filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, praying for liquidated damages in the amount of over P700 million, plus over P400 million for each further violation by Revillame, or for each week of violation of their contract. Later on, ABS-CBN applied for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to restrain Revillame from performing with TV5, owned by ABC Development Corporation (ABC Corporation) on a similar show, titled “Willing Willie.” The RTC denied the TRO application but ordered Revillame to post a bond in the amount of P426,917,646.96 as security for any damage that may be incurred by ABSCBN. The company then proceeded to file a complaint with the Makati RTC for copyright infringement against Revillame, ABC Corporation, Wilproductions Inc., and one Ray Espinosa. This prompted ABC Corporation and Espinosa to go to the CA to restrain the Makati RTC from proceeding with the copyright infringement case. The CA ruled in favor of ABC Corporation and Espinosa, finding that ABS-CBN engaged in forum shopping for filing two suits: (1) its Compulsory Counterclaim in Civil Case No. Q-10-67770 pending before the Quezon City RTC and (2) the Complaint for Copyright Infringement pending before the Makati RTC. The CA found that both cases are based on one cause of action: Revillame’s alleged breach of its contract with ABS-CBN. The Supreme Court would later affirm the CA’s ruling in a separate case (G.R. No. 201664). The post ABS-CBN review petition vs Willie dismissed appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Sabotaging reforms
Consumer groups have petitioned the Court of Appeals to take back its permanent injunction on the Energy Regulatory Commission ruling stopping San Miguel Corp. from breaking its supply contracts. The Power for People or P4P Coalition cited the real threat of a chain reaction in other power producers holding straight pricing contracts similar to SMC’s units to make a mockery out of the competitive selection process, or CSP since they can always go to the courts to overturn ERC decisions. The CA injunction effectively opened the door for SMC to discard the PSAs without any consequence. Under the PSA, a unilateral termination of the contract will mean heavy penalties including P255.5 billion for a “Termination in the Event of a Default.” The CA injunction took away all the safeguards in the contract against unilateral actions which was what SMC wanted. ERC issued an order blocking SMC from forcing consumers to shoulder fossil fuel volatility costs which it committed initially to absorbing during the auction for the PSAs. Based on ERC records, some 23 straight-price contracts are at risk of following the footsteps of SMC which will mean higher rates since the court injunction can undermine the regulatory powers of the ERC. P4P said consumers are now at the mercy of power companies which acquired the freedom to trick us into committing to a contract, “only to back down when it is no longer profitable for them.” Consumers are without a choice but to pay higher prices in such a situation. In the 2019 PSA auctions, SMC’s generation companies South Premier Power Corporation, or SPPC, and San Miguel Energy Corporation, or SMEC, secured 650 megawatts or MW and 330 MW supply deals, respectively. SMC in response to consumer groups’ skepticism over the ability of fossil fuel power plants operators to comply with a fixed price contract, insisted it will voluntarily shoulder risks. In May last year, SMC filed motions for price adjustment claiming that it had incurred P15 billion in losses from SPPC and SMEC. Late last year, ERC denied SMC’s motions for price adjustments. Instead of appealing the ERC order, SMEC and SPPC filed a petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals to suspend their PSAs and reverse the ERC’s decision. CA quickly acted with a temporary restraining order suspending SPPC’s 670 MW PSA while SMEC’s PSA remained after the 16th division of the court denied SMC a TRO. The catch, however, was that the CA consolidated the two cases into the 13th division which acted favorably to SMC. The recent injunction order, thus covered both SPPC and SMEC, thus ending the PSAs. To make up for the lost capacity of 670 MW, two emergency Power Supply Agreements, or EPSA, was bid out with SPPC cornering a supply of 480 MW. In the five months that the SPPC PSA was suspended, electricity bills have jumped from P1,370.90 to P3,363.53 for an average household. P4P described the battle between ERC and SMC as an experience in which big businesses ultimately hijack power purchase bidding systems that are in place to protect consumers. It added that SMC dared to bid for the same power requirement shortage of Meralco that it caused. The spirit of competitive selection and least-cost electricity thus went out of the window after the brazen legal maneuvers of SMC, the consequence of which will be shouldered by consumers. Reforms initiated to improve the lives of ordinary Filipinos are negated by profit greed which frequently happens with the help of the intrusive injunctions. The post Sabotaging reforms appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
CA orders release of 4 Chinese nabbed in POGO Las Piñas raid
The Court of Appeals ordered the release of four Chinese nationals arrested in a police raid on a Philippine Offshore Gaming Operation (POGO) in Las Piñas City on 27 June. The raid was conducted by the Philippine National Police Anti-Cyber Crime Group (PNP-ACG). Covered by the CA’s 10th Division order dated 28 July 2023 were Ang Chin Keong, Choo Jun Cheng, Choo Wei Jazz, and a certain "Edy". Lawyer Jocel Isidro Dilag filed the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the four foreign nationals. A writ of habeas corpus “is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place.” It extends “to all cases of illegal and arbitrary detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.” “We have examined into the cause of caption and restraint of Keong, et al., and we are satisfied that they are unlawfully restrained. The totality of the circumstances show that Keong, et al, were unlawfully restrained,” the CA said in an 18-page decision penned by Associate Justice Rex Bernard Pascual. “The PNP, through P/BGen Jose Melencio Nartatez, Jr., P/BGen Sidney S. Hernia, PCol. Atty. Arvie A. Paraon-Bueno, PCol. Atty. Nova De Castro, and all those acting under their instructions and command, including those who may have taken actual, legal, and/or constructive custody of Keong, et al., are ordered to immediately discharge and/or release from any custody, detention, confinement, or other restraint which is currently undertaken at Hong Tai Compound, 501 Alabang Zapote Road, Almanza Uno, Las Piñas City,” the CA added. Named respondents in the petition for the writ of habeas corpus are Nartatez, regional director of the National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), and Hernia, director of the PNP-ACG. The four petitioners were among the more than 2,700 individuals, including 600 Chinese, 180 Vietnamese, 140 Indonesian, 130 Malaysian nationals, and Filipinos, who were detained at the premises of the Hong Tai Compound, a mixed-use facility for residential and commercial purposes, situated along Alabang Zapote Road, Almanza Uno, Las Piñas City. They claimed that a large part of the Filipino group had already been released by the respondents, while foreigners, including Keong’s group, are still detained in their respective rooms “against their will, without any running water and food rations”. Also, the petitioners claimed they were even required to get the respondents’ permission just to gain access to a working toilet or buy potable water from the compound’s convenience store. The PNP-ACG on the other hand defended the raid and told the CA that the foreign nationals were not allowed to leave the premises being potential victims of human trafficking. The respondents noted that most of them are with expired passports, no working visas, or minors, whose passports are captured by the employer POGO facility. The PNP-ACG said they had already referred the foreign nationals to the Bureau of Immigration (BI) and the Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking (IACAT) for assessment as potential trafficking victims. But in siding with the petitioners, the Court took into consideration the failure of the PNP to present a copy of the search warrants used as the basis for conducting the raid. The CA noted, “The fact that no search warrants were presented by the PNP would show that the warrants are adverse to it. Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced, unless contradicted and overcome by other evidence.” It further held that "no judicial process was presented to the Court by the PNP to allow for the continued detention of Keong et al." Also, it said even the purported protective custody of Keong, et. al., does not justify their continued restraint. While the PNP cited the Expanded Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012 as the process to secure and restrict the movement of the said foreign nationals who are possible victims of human trafficking, the appellate court held that the absence of the latter's consent is "fatal to their continued detention." The post CA orders release of 4 Chinese nabbed in POGO Las Piñas raid appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Appeal of the CSC (2)
For the concluding part of the article on the propriety of appeal by the Civil Service Commission or CSC, I will discuss another case that the Court revisited in Fuentes, and how the Supreme Court clarified the guidelines on the legal standing of the CSC to appeal a reversal of its decisions before the Supreme Court. The Case of Ombudsman vs Gutierrez, G.R. 189100, 21 June 2017 (Gutierrez) Gutierrez cited the previous cases of National Police Commission vs Mamauag (G.R. 149999, 12 August 2005) and Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (G.R. 169982, 23 November 2007). Both cases specified that the government party appealing must not be the quasi-judicial body that meted out the administrative sanction but the prosecuting body in the administrative case. Unlike Dacoycoy and Mathay Jr. where the CSC was the appellant, it was the Ombudsman who filed the appeal in Gutierrez. Gutierrez clothed the Ombudsman with legal standing to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has resolved but disallowed other quasi-judicial bodies (such as CSC) the same privilege, contending that the difference in treatment is owing to the Ombudsman’s special dual role of being a disciplining authority and prosecuting agency. Such notwithstanding, the Court, in Fuentes, stated that it finds no real difference between the Ombudsman’s role of being both a disciplinary authority and an agency imbued with prosecutorial powers vis-à-vis the CSC’s role as disciplining authority when it comes to both quasi-judicial agencies’ exercise of administrative power. It echoed the opinion of Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo that the variance in legal effects and procedural framework in the Ombudsman’s roles in administrative and criminal proceedings warrant different treatments. While the Ombudsman’s prosecutorial powers have specific application to criminal cases, the legal standing of the Ombudsman and the CSC to challenge a reversal of their respective rulings in administrative cases comes from their status as disciplining authority. Resolution In view of the foregoing discussions, the Supreme Court, in Fuentes, clarified the rules on CSC’s legal standing to appeal a reversal of its decisions as follows: As a general rule, the CSC has standing to bring an appeal before the Supreme Court as an aggrieved party affected by the reversal or modification of its decisions; As an exception, the Supreme Court can dismiss the petition filed by the CSC if an opposing party clearly shows that the CSC has no standing to bring the appeal (i.e. when the decision will not seriously prejudice the civil service system, will not impair the effectiveness of government, does not have a deleterious effect on the government, or does not have an adverse impact on the integrity of the civil service); and In any event, the appointing authority, prosecuting agency, appointee, or private complainant in appropriate cases is not precluded from elevating a decision adverse to them for review. It must be noted that in Fuentes, the Court applied the general rule and held that CSC can bring an appeal to the Supreme Court as an aggrieved party due to the reversal of its decision by the Court of Appeals. **** For more of Dean Nilo Divina’s legal tidbits, please visit www.divinalaw.com. For comments and questions, please send an email to cabdo@divinalaw.com. The post Appeal of the CSC (2) appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»
Appeal of Civil Service Commission (1)
Does the Civil Service Commission or CSC have a legal standing to appeal to the Supreme Court a reversal or modification of its decision by the appellate court? The Supreme Court was once again confronted with this issue in the recent case of CSC vs. Fuentes (Fuentes) [G.R. 237322, 10 January 2023]. In laying down the guidelines as to when the CSC can appeal a reversal of its decisions, the Court found it necessary to revisit the mandate of the CSC and its powers and functions, and did a survey of jurisprudence which involved the same issue. The CSC’s role as the government’s central personnel agency is at the core of its mandate. From this overarching role stems all the others — the task to establish a career service; adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service; strengthen the merit and rewards system; integrate all human resources development programs; institutionalize a management climate conducive to public accountability; and report to the President and the Congress. Section 12, Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, enumerates the CSC’s powers and functions, which include, among others, the following: SECTION 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions: (6) Appoint and discipline its officials and employees in accordance with law and exercise control and supervision over the activities of the Commission; *** (11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. *** In the Fuentes case, the Court concluded that the CSC cannot thoroughly perform its constitutional mandate of being a central personnel agency without its power to discipline its officials and employees, and held that “the Commission’s role of being a central personnel agency would be unduly crippled without its disciplinary power.” The case of CSC vs Dacoycoy, G.R. No. 135805, 29 April 1999 (Dacoycoy): Dacoycoy categorically abandoned the Supreme Court’s earlier decision ruling that the civil service law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges,” firmly expanded the scope of an “aggrieved party” and declared that, as a party adversely affected by the ruling of the Court of Appeals exonerating the public official or employee, the CSC may appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court elucidated that under such circumstances, the CSC becomes an aggrieved party — a party adversely affected by the ruling of the Court of Appeals, which will “seriously prejudice the civil service system.” The case of CSC vs Mathay Jr., G.R. 124374, 15 December 1999 (Mathay, Jr.): Seven months after the Court’s promulgation of Dacoycoy, it decided on Mathay Jr. In declaring that the CSC had no legal standing to bring an appeal before the Supreme Court, the latter drew a line between Mathay Jr. and Dacoycoy by ruling that, while Dacoycoy involved nepotism — an administrative case “whose deleterious effect on government cannot be overemphasized,” Mathay Jr. merely involved reinstatement, an issue that can hardly “impair the effectiveness of government.” For this reason, the Supreme Court held that its ruling in Dacoycoy did not apply to Mathay Jr. The reasoning of the Court behind Mathay Jr. stemmed from the fact that the CSC’s power to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal is judicial instead of adversarial. Hence, CSC is more of a judge than a litigant. The Court went on to explain that as a quasi-judicial body with the role of an adjudicator, the CSC should be impartial and detached; and concluded that the CSC would risk becoming an advocate if it would be allowed to appeal to the Supreme Court. (To be continued) The post Appeal of Civil Service Commission (1) appeared first on Daily Tribune......»»